The rst part of the paper is devoted to the study of revision programs, introduced by Marek and Truszczy nski MT93, MT94, MT95a] to formalize interpretation update in a language similar to the language of logic programming.
Revision programs are essentially sets of logic program rules, which can be interpreted as inference rules and used to update interpretations. Marek and Truszczy nski proved that logic programs with stable semantics are embeddable into revision programs. We show that, conversely, there is also a simple embedding of revision programs into logic programs with stable semantics. Thus the two formalisms are equivalent. We show that various properties of revision programs are easily derived from this translation and from known properties of logic programs. Moreover, the embedding of revision programs into logic programs suggests a new de nition for the more general class of disjunctive revision programs, obtained by translating such programs into disjunctive logic programs.
While revision programs provide a useful and natural de nition of interpretation update, they are limited to a fairly restricted set of update rules and thus are not su ciently expressive to capture more complex interpretation updates which may be described by arbitrarily complex formulae, or, more generally, by arbitrary inference rules. Accordingly, in the second part of the paper we introduce the notion of rule update | interpretation update by arbitrary sets of inference rules. The proposed formalism is not only more general and expressive than revision programming, but also has a very simple and natural de nition.
In order to investigate the expressiveness of rule update, we compare it to update by means of arbitrary sets of formulae, showing that formula update corresponds to a simple subclass of rule update. We also investigate the role played in rule update by the \directionality" of rules. Finally, we specify a simple embedding of rule update into default logic, obtained by augmenting the original update rules with inertia axioms analogous to those used in the translation of revision programs into logic programs. The translation into default logic provides a bridge between our newly introduced formalism and a well-known non-monotonic formalism. It also suggests a possible generalization of rule updates to \disjunctive rule updates" based on disjunctive default logic GLPT91] .
The introduction of rule update provides a new framework for interpretation updates and thus also for theory updates. In spite of its great simplicity, rule update constitutes a powerful and expressive mechanism which determines updates of theories by arbitrarily complex sets of inference rules and is applicable to various knowledge domains. For example, in MT95b] McCain and Turner apply rule update to the problem of reasoning about the e ects of actions.
We proceed with preliminary de nitions in Section 2. In Sections 3 & 4 we specify a simple embedding of revision programming into logic programming and show that basic results obtained by Marek and Truszczy nski for revision programs are easily deduced from this embedding and from known properties of logic programs. In Sections 5, 6 & 7 we de ne rule update, compare it to update by means of propositional formulae, investigate how the \directionality" of inference rules in uences rule update, and specify a simple embedding of rule update into default logic. Given a propositional language K, we represent an interpretation of K as a maximal consistent set of literals from K. For any set ? of formulae from K, by Cn(? ) we denote the least set of formulae from K that contains ? and is also closed under propositional logic.
Inference rules over K will be written as expressions of the form where and are formulae from K. 3 Let R be a set of inference rules over K, and let ? be a set of formulae from K. We write ?`R if is a formula from K belonging to the least set of formulae containing ? that is closed under propositional logic and also closed with respect to the inference rules in R. We say that ? is closed under R if ? = f : ?`R g:
A default rule over K is an expression of the form : 1 ; : : :; n (1) where all of ; 1 ; : : :; n ; are formulae from K. For a default rule r as in (1), we de ne prerequisite(r) = , justi cations(r) = f 1 ; : : :; n g, and consequent(r) = . If justi cations(r) is empty, we identify r with the corresponding inference rule . If in addition prerequisite(r) = True, we sometimes simply write .
A default theory over K is a set of default rules over K. Let D be a default theory over K and let E be a set of formulae from K. We de ne the reduct of D with respect to E, denoted by D E , as follows. GL90 ] (see also Prz94]) Let K be a propositional language. Let K be an extended propositional language obtained from K by augmenting it with new propositional letters A, for some (or all) propositional letters A in K. The new propositional symbols A are called strong (or \classical") negation of A. A logic program P over the extended language K , which contains at least one of the atoms A, is called an extended logic program. We call a stable model of P over K an extended stable model of P if there is no atom A 2 K such that both A and A are true in M. u t
Embedding Revision Programs into Logic Programs
Revision programs were introduced by Marek and Truszczy nski in MT93, MT94, MT95a] in order to formalize interpretation update in a language similar to the language of logic programming. They showed that logic programs with stable semantics are embeddable into revision programs but stated that their revision formalism is strictly more general than logic programming: \This formalism properly extends logic programming with stable semantics. ...] However, revision programming is signi cantly more expressive. ...] While logic programs do not allow one to state that an atom must be absent from a model, revision programs explicitly talk about deletions" MT94]. In this section we show that there is a simple embedding of revision programs into logic programs with stable semantics and into extended logic programs with stable semantics. Consequently, the two formalisms are precisely equivalent. In the next section we show how one can easily derive various properties of revision programs from this translation and from known properties of logic programs.
Revision Programs
We rst recall the de nition of revision programs. Following MT94] we x a countable set U.
De nition3. (Revision Programs) MT94] A revision in-rule or, simply, an
in-rule, is any expression of the form in(p) in(q 1 ); : : :; in(q m ); out(s 1 ); : : :; out(s n );
(3) where p, q i , 1 i m, and s j , 1 j n, are all in U and m; n 0. A revision out-rule or, simply, an out-rule, is any expression of the form out(p) in(q 1 ); : : :; in(q m ); out(s 1 ); : : :; out(s n ); (4) where p, q i , 1 i m, and s j , 1 j n, are all in U and m; n 0.
A collection of in-rules and out-rules is called a revision program. Any subset B of U is called a knowledge base. u t Clearly, revision programs can be syntactically viewed as positive logic programs (or as propositional Horn theories). However, as we will see below, they are given a special revision semantics which di ers signi cantly from the least model semantics of positive logic programs. We rst need the de nition of the necessary change determined by a revision program. 
Translating revision programs into logic programs
We rst show how to embed revision programs into logic programs with stable semantics and then we produce an equivalent embedding into extended logic programs. In order to translate revision programs into logic programs we rst consider a propositional language K whose set of propositional letters consists of fin(q) : q 2 Ug fout(q) : q 2 Ug fin I (q) : q 2 Ug fout I (q) : q 2 Ug.
De nition6. (Translating revision programs into logic programs) The
translation of the revision program P and the initial knowledge base B I into a logic program is de ned as the logic program P(P; B I ) = P I P N P over K consisting of the following three subprograms:
Initial Knowledge Rules P I : All q 2 B I are initially in and all s 6 2 B I are initially out:
for all q 2 B I and all s 6 2 B I . Inertia Rules P N : If q was initially in (respectively, out) then after revision it remains in (respectively, out) unless it was forced out (respectively, in):
in(q) in I (q); notout(q) (7) out(q) out I (q); not in(q)
for all q 2 U. Revision Rules P: All the in-rules and out-rules that belong to the original revision program P.
A stable model M of P(P; B I ) is called coherent if it does not contain both in(q) and out(q), for any q 2 U. u t Observe that the above translation is quite simple. It preserves the original revision program P and adds to it the set of facts representing the initial state B I and two simple inertia axiom schemas stating that things do not change from one state to another unless they are forced to. M 1 = fout(a); in(b)g M 2 = fin(a); out(b)g and therefore correspond to the two P-justi ed revisions fbg and fag. u t
Translating revision programs into extended logic programs
We now observe that the translation described above can be easily expressed in the language of extended logic programs with strong (or \classical") negation. According to De nition 2, in order to translate revision programs into extended logic programs we rst consider a propositional language K , whose set of propo- Inertia Rules: If q was initially in (respectively, not in) then after revision it remains in (respectively, not in) unless forced to be not in (respectively, in): in(q) in I (q); not in(q) (23) in(q) in I (q); not in(q)
for all q 2 U. Revision Rules: All the in-rules and out-rules of the original revision program P, with propositions out(q) replaced everywhere by in(q).
u t
The only di erence between the two embeddings is that we are using the strong negation in() of in() instead of out(). Revision programs are embeddable into extended logic programs with strong (or \classical") negation. . u t Proof. By De nition 6, the translation P(R(P); ;) of the revision program R(P) into a logic program consists of R(P) itself and the initial knowledge rules: out I (q) ; for all q 2 U together with the inertia rules 12 : out(q) not in(q); for all q 2 U:
After performing a single step of partial evaluation on the premises out(s j ) of rules from R(P) (by using the above inertia rules), the rules of R(P) become equivalent to: in(p) in(q 1 ); : : :; in(q m ); notin(s 1 ); : : :; notin(s n ) and thus they are equivalent (up to renaming) to the rules of the original program P. Theorem 7 now easily implies the equivalence between stable models of P and justi ed revisions of P(R). 2
As we establish in Section 7, the embeddability of revision programs into default logic also follows from Theorem 9. Since revision programming is equivalent to logic programming under stable semantics, computational methods developed for the stable semantics (or, perhaps, for its approximations, such as the wellfounded semantics) can be used to provide a query answering mechanism for revision programming.
Extending revision programming to disjunctive programs
In MT94] the authors propose an extension of revision programming to disjunctive revision programs consisting of rules of the following form. in(p 1 )_ _in(p k )_out(r 1 )_ _out(r l ) in(q 1 ); :::; in(q m ); out(s 1 ); :::; out(s n ) However, the proposed de nition exhibits an intuitively undesirable behavior. 13 For example, given the disjunctive revision program P = fin(a)_in(b)g and initial knowledge base B I = fag we obtain fa; bg as one of two P-justi ed revisions of B I , which seems to violate the principle of minimization of updates.
However, it is easy to de ne a natural semantics for disjunctive revision programs P by rst translating them, using De nition 6, into logic programs and then applying a suitable semantics to the resulting disjunctive logic program P(P; B I ). In particular, one can use the disjunctive stable semantics, originally introduced in GL90, Prz91].
Another possibility, discussed later in the paper, is to translate revision programs into default logic. By utilizing the translation of revision programs into logic programs, default logic or some other non-monotonic formalism, we eliminate the need for the introduction of an entirely new formalism for revision programs but rely instead on already well-established and thoroughly investigated non-monotonic formalisms.
Rule Update
The revision programs discussed in the rst part of the paper are sets of revision in-rules and out-rules, which can be interpreted as inference rules and are used to update interpretations. Revision programming therefore de nes the notion of interpretation update by means of revision in-rules and out-rules. In this section we introduce a de nition of interpretation update by means of inference rules, or rule update. The de nition of rule update is simpler than the de nition of revision programming.It is also signi cantly more general, since it allows updates by means of arbitrary inference rules. First we will show that I 2 is an update of I 1 by R 1 . Notice that I 1 \ I 2 = fa; cg and that I 1 \I 2`R1 :b : So for all literals L 2 I 2 , I 1 \I 2`R1 L . And since Cn (I 2 ) is closed under R 1 , we have shown that I 2 is an update of I 1 by R. A symmetric argument shows that the interpretation fa; b; :cg is also an update of I 1 by R.
On the other hand, if we take I 3 = f:a; b; cg, then we have I 1 \ I 3 = fb; cg; and we see that I 1 \I 3 6 R1 :a: So I 3 is not an update of I 1 by R 1 . One can similarly show that the interpretation fa; :b; :cg is not an update of I 1 by R. u t 6 Properties of Rule Update
In this section we consider basic properties of rule update. In particular, we compare our de nition of update by means of inference rules to the notion of update by means of formulae. For this purpose we de ne below a notion of \formula-update" of interpretations that corresponds to the notion of update in Win88], and we show that rule update is more general than formula update. We also investigate the expressiveness associated with the \directionality" of rules.
De nition13. (Formula-update) Given interpretations I; I 0 ; I 00 , we say that I 0 is closer to I than I 00 is if I 00 \ I is a proper subset of I 0 \ I.
Let ? be a set of formulae. Let I; I 0 be interpretations. We say that I 0 is a formula-update of I by ? if I 0 is a model of ? such that no model of ? is closer to I than I 0 is. u t In order to compare formula-update and rule update, we introduce the following de nition. Thus, in such cases, the directionality of rules has no e ect at all. We might say, informally speaking: the greater the di erence between update with respect to R and formula-update with respect to Theory(R), the greater the e ect of directionality. We explore this remark below.
De nition18. Let R; R 0 be sets of inferences rules. R 0 is as strong as R if for all sets ? of formulae, if ? is closed under R 0 then ? is closed under R. u t It is clear that if R 0 is as strong as R, then for any formula , ?`R0 whenever ?`R . We use this fact in the proof of the following proposition. Proposition19. Let R; R 0 be sets of inferences rules, with Cn(Theory(R)) = Cn(Theory(R 0 )). Let I be an interpretation. If R 0 is as strong as R, then an interpretation I 0 is an update of I by R 0 whenever it is an update of I by R. u t Proof. Assume that R 0 is as strong as R and that I 0 is an update of I by R. Since Cn(Theory(R)) = Cn(Theory(R 0 )) and Cn(I 0 ) is closed under R, we can conclude that Cn(I 0 ) is closed under R 0 . Let L be a literal in I 0 . We already know that I \ I 0`R L. Since R 0 is as strong as R, it follows by previous observation that I \ I 0`R 0 L. 2 Now we de ne an ordering on inference rules that, intuitively, allows us to compare the degree of directionality in (otherwise similar) rules.
De nition20. Let , 0 , , 0 be propositional formulae. Roughly speaking, the idea behind this ordering of rules is that, as we move from left to right, the degree of directionality in the rule is lessened, which makes the rule \stronger". Below, we make this claim precise. u t Let R be a set of inferences rules, and let r and r 0 be inference rules such that r r 0 . It is clear that Cn(Theory(R frg)) = Cn(Theory(R fr 0 g)). Moreover, it follows easily from the de nitions that R fr 0 g is as strong as R frg. Thus, we have the following corollary to Proposition 19.
Corollary 21. Let R be a set of inferences rules and let r; r 0 be inference rules such that r r 0 . Let I be an interpretation. Every update of I by R frg is also an update of I by R fr 0 g. u t
Embedding Rule Update in Default Logic
In this section we show that there is a simple embedding of rule update into default logic. This embedding uses a principle of inertia analogous to the inertia rules used in Section 3 to embed revision programs into logic programs. As a corollary we obtain a simple embedding of Marek and Truszczy nski's revision programming into rule update.
We begin by extending a propositional language K in the following manner. For every atom A of K, let A 0 be a new atom. By K 0 we denote the language obtained by extending K with all such new atoms. For any literal L of K, by L 0 we denote the literal obtained from L by replacing the atom A that occurs in L i Cn(I 0 I 0 ) is an extension of D(R; I) For the second part, assume that E is a consistent extension of D(R; I). We need to show that there is an interpretation I 0 of K such that E = Cn(I 0 I 0 ). Suppose otherwise; so there is an atom A of K such that A = 2 E and :A = 2 E. But D includes the following two inertia rules: A 0 : A A and :A 0 : :A :A . It follows that D(R; I) E includes the following two rules: A 0 A and :A 0 :A . Since neither A nor :A belong to E, we can conclude that neither A 0 nor :A 0 belong to I 0 , which contradicts the fact that I is an interpretation of K. 2
Rule Update Extends Revision Programming
Revision programming can be seen as the special case of rule update in which every rule in R has the form L 1^ ^L n L 0 where each L i (0 i n) is a literal. This fact is established in the following corollary to Theorems 23 and 9. It is possible to extend the de nition of rule update so that it encompasses the disjunctive revision programs considered in Section 4.1. We brie y sketch this possibility below. In Section 4.1 we considered the fact that disjunctive revision programs can be given a natural semantics based on disjunctive logic programming under the stable semantics. But the treatment of disjunction under this approach di ers markedly from the treatment of disjunction in rule update. For instance, we can compare the disjunctive revision program P = f in(a) _ out(a) g with update by R = f a _ :a g . According to the de nition considered in Section 4.1, both ; and fag would be P-justi ed revisions of fag, whereas fag is the only update of fag by R.
Using disjunctive default logic GLPT91], it is possible to incorporate these two di erent treatments of disjunction into a single de nition of update. Disjunctive default logic is an extension of default logic in which the symbol \j" is introduced to denote a second kind of disjunction, corresponding essentially to the treatment of disjunction in disjunctive logic programming. Thus, disjunctive logic programming under the stable semantics is equivalent to a subclass of disjunctive default logic GLPT91]. We rely on this fact below. Let R be a justi cation-free disjunctive default theory. So R is a set of rules of the form 1 j : : : j n where all of ; 1 ; : : :; n are propositional formulae. Let I; I 0 be interpretations.
We can say that I 0 is a disjunctive update of I by R if Cn(I 0 ) is an extension of the disjunctive default theory (I \ I 0 ) R.
It is straightforward to verify that this de nition would extend rule update. Furthermore, if we were to translate \disjunctive rule update" into disjunctive default logic, as in De nition 22, we would obtain a correct embedding of disjunctive update into disjunctive default logic. 14 Finally, it would also be easy to extend Corollary 25 to show that \disjunctive rule update" indeed extends the notion of disjunctive revision programming considered in Section 4.1.
14 The proof of Theorem 23 is easily adapted to show correctness in this more general setting.
